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LOSING FAITH: LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES IN ARKANSAS
AND THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH
Frances S. Fendler*
Suppose the following hypothetical: A and B set up a Limited Liability
Company (LLC) called ABLLC to construct and operate a water park. They
sign an operating agreement. ABLLC is a manager-managed LLC, and B is
the manager. A owns a 49% membership interest in the LLC, and B owns a
51% interest. B also owns Blackacre, the land that the parties intend to ac-
quire for the LLC, on which the water park is to be built. Although ABLLC
has no written contract to purchase Blackacre, the parties' intentions are
undisputed. B, as manager, acting on behalf of ABLLC, even makes a con-
tract with a contractor owned by A to construct the water park on Blackacre.
At the same time that these negotiations and transactions between A and B
are taking place, B is secretly negotiating to sell Blackacre to a third party
for a higher price. And that is what she does, without informing A in ad-
vance of her decision to do so. A responds by suing B for damages for
breach of fiduciary duty.
The Arkansas Supreme Court confronted substantially this situation in
K. C. Properties of N. W. Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment Partners, LLC,1
its first decision addressing fiduciary duties in Arkansas LLCs.2 The signifi-
cant difference between the hypothetical and the actual case is that B was
not an individual but rather three different LLCs owned and managed by the
same individuals, either directly or through their personal LLCs. The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court held that the defendants had done nothing wrong and
affirmed a grant of summary judgment by the trial court.3 The court failed to
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School
of Law. The author is grateful to Professor Robert Steinbuch, University of Arkansas at Little
Rock William H. Bowen School of Law, Professor Joan Heminway, University of Tennessee
College of Law, and John Thomas Hardin, Esq., of the Rose Law Firm, for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. 373 Ark. 14, - S.W.3d _, 2008 WL 659825 (Mar. 13, 2008).
2. Six years ago, in an unpublished opinion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed an allegation of breach of fiduciary duty in an Arkansas LLC. In that case, unlike this
one, the operating agreement specifically addressed and permitted the manager's challenged
actions. The court relied on that fact in concluding that there had been no breach. Ault v.
Brady, 37 F. App'x 222, 2002 WL 1301520 (8th Cir. 2002).
3. K.C. Props. of N.W. Ark., Inc., 373 Ark. at 33, _ S.W.3d at . The court also
considered the application of ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-304 (LEXIS Repl. 2001), captioned
"Liability of Members to Third Parties," and properly held that it does not "shield one mem-
ber of a limited-liability company from being held liable to another member," but rather
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focus on the individual defendants' fundamental conflict of interest. It also
failed to address the basic fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith underly-
ing the case and incorporated into Arkansas's LLC Acta-duties that were
not circumscribed in the parties' LLC operating agreement.' As a conse-
quence, the court failed to put the burden on the defendants, fiduciaries who
had a conflict of interest, 6 to prove to a finder of fact that their actions were
fair and in good faith.7 Instead, the court decided that the individual defen-
dants were insulated from liability by doing business through the multiple
LLCs. This decision is unfortunate. The court missed an opportunity to ana-
lyze the fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith, the relationship between
those fiduciary duties, and the privilege of doing business through LLCs in
Arkansas.
Because of their control of ABLLC's manager, I contend that the indi-
vidual defendants owed fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith directly to
the plaintiff, A. Those fiduciary duties transcended the artificial boundaries
of the LLCs through which the defendants chose to own and carry out the
water park venture that all of the parties contemplated.
This article begins by relating in more detail the facts of K.C. Proper-
ties.8 Then I explain why the individual defendants, who owned and con-
trolled ABLLC's manager, owed fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith
directly to the plaintiff A, despite the device of intervening LLCs that they
"prohibit[s] suit by a third party against one member of a limited-liability company for
another member's actions." K.C. Props. of N.W Ark., Inc., 373 Ark. at 20-21, _ S.W.3d at
(emphasis in original).
4. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2001) and discussion infra Part
III.
5. The defendants did not allege, and the court's opinion does not indicate, that the
Ozark operating agreement restricted PMS's fiduciary duties in any relevant way. Thus, this
case does not implicate the issues I addressed in an earlier article, i.e., whether and to what
extent fiduciary duties in Arkansas LLCs can be restricted or eliminated by the parties'
agreement. Frances S. Fendler, A License to Lie, Cheat, and Steal? Restriction or Elimina-
tion of Fiduciary Duties in Arkansas Limited Liability Companies, 60 ARK. L. REv. 643, 645-
47 (2007) [hereinafter "Fendler"].
6. See discussion infra Part II.C.
7. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coughlin, 369 Ark. 365, 370, 255 S.W.3d 424,
428 (2007):
The burden of proving that the transaction between the director and the corpora-
tion is made in good faith and is fair to the corporation lies with the director ....
"[I]n the search for inherent fairness and good faith to a corporation and its
shareholders, conduct of directors must be subjected to 'rigorous scrutiny when
conflicting self-interest is shown."
(quoting Hall v. Staha, 314 Ark. 71, 79, 858 S.W.2d 672, 676 (1993)); Susan Webber (now
U.S. District Judge Susan Webber Wright), Arkansas Corporate Fiduciary Standards-
Interested Directors' Contracts and the Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity, 5 UALR L.J. 39,
53 (1982) [hereinafter "Webber"].
8. See infra Part 1.
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employed.9 Next, I demonstrate that the individual defendants may have
breached those fiduciary duties by selling Blackacre to a third party without
disclosing their plans to the plaintiff, presenting issues of fact that should
have precluded summary judgment against the plaintiff A.'
I. THE FACTS OF K. C. PROPERTIES
The facts of the case are complex, as is common when people make in-
vestments through multiple limited liability entities. The dramatis personae
are as follows:
Tim Graham ("Graham"),
Tim Graham, LLC ("Graham LLC"), owned and managed by Graham,
J.B. Hunt ("Hunt"),
J.B. Hunt, LLC ("Hunt LLC"), owned and managed by Hunt,
Bill W. Schwyhart ("Schwyhart"),
Schwyhart Holding, LLC ("Schwyhart LLC"), owned and managed by
Schwyhart,
Ozark Mountain Water Park, LLC ("Ozark"),
K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkansas, Inc. ("K.C. Properties"), 49% mem-
ber of Ozark, owned by Ken Bailey and Carlos Treat,
Buildings, Inc. ("Buildings"), construction contractor, owned by Ken
Bailey and Carlos Treat,
Pinnacle Management Services, LLC (PMS), manager of Ozark. PMS's
managers were Graham, Hunt, and Schwyhart, and its members
were Graham LLC, Hunt LLC, and Schwyhart LLC,
Lowell Investment Partners, LLC (LIP), 51% member of Ozark. LIP
was managed by PMS, although it had no members, no operating
agreement, and no assets,
9. See infra Parts II & HI.
10. See infra Part IV.
20091
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Pinnacle Hills Realty, LLC (PHR), owner of the land in question.
PHR's managers were Graham, Hunt, and Schwyhart," and its
members were Graham LLC, Hunt LLC, Schwyhart LLC, and
Parker Northwest Properties, LLC ("Parker"), ultimate purchaser of the
land.
12
At the heart of the case is Ozark, an LLC owned by K.C. Properties
and LIP and managed by PMS. The parties formed Ozark to construct and
operate "the water park at or near the intersection of Interstate 540 and
Highway 264 in Lowell, Arkansas."' 3 The parties intended Ozark to buy
about 16.5 acres of a 34-acre tract for $3 million.1 4 The 34-acre tract was
owned by PHR, an LLC owned and managed by the same individuals who
owned and managed PMS, Ozark's manager, and LIP, Ozark's majority
member. Ozark and its constituents entered into an operating agreement, and
on that same day, Ozark entered into a contract with Buildings to construct
the water park. A little over a month later, without prior warning to K.C.
Properties, the defendants caused PHR to sell the entire 34-acre tract to a
third party, Parker, for over $8 million.
K.C. Properties 15 sued all of the LLCs (except PHR, the entity that
owned the land) and the individuals who lay behind them for breach of con-
tract and breach of fiduciary duties. The trial court entered summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants. K.C. Properties appealed. The Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against
K.C. Properties.
16
On its face, PHR's sale of the entire tract to Parker seems unobjection-
able. The parties had no written contract for the sale of the land to Ozark,
and a landowner who is dealing at arms length is, of course, free to sell his
land for the highest price he can get for it. That is essentially the rationale
the court set out in affirming the summary judgment in favor of the defen-
11. Appellants' Substituted Brief, Volume I, at Arg 3, K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkan-
sas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment Partners, LLC, No. 07 00471 (Ark. Nov. 8, 2007).
12. The identities of and relationships among these entities and individuals are described
in various places throughout the opinion.
13. K.C. Props. ofN.W. Ark., 373 Ark. at 18, S.W.3dat-.
14. Although the defendants were not bound by any written contract to sell the 16.5 acre
plot to Ozark, they admitted that the parties intended this transaction to take place. Appellee's
Brief at ARG 4, K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment Partners, LLC,
No. 07 00471 (Ark. Aug. 1, 2007).
15. The contractor, Buildings, Inc., was also a plaintiff in the case, and an appellant.
16. The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against Buildings on
a breach of contract claim. K. Props. of N.W Ark., 373 Ark. at 33, __ S.W.3d at-.
[Vol. 31
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dants. 17 The problem here is that the landowner was not dealing at arms
length with Ozark.
Three individuals were on both sides of the deal and each of these par-
ties understood that the deal entailed the sale of the 16.5 acres to Ozark. Tim
Graham, J.B. Hunt, and Bill Schwyhart owned and controlled, either directly
or through their personal LLCs, Ozark's manager PMS. As manager, PMS
had the duty to further Ozark's interests as the intended buyer. At the same
time, these same individuals owned and controlled PHR, the seller of the
land. Therefore, the defendants were on both the buy side and the sell side
of the deal. As a result, they had a conflict of interest that implicated the
fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith. They may have breached these
duties by acting in secret s to sell the land to Parker, a third party. At least,
the court should have placed the burden on the defendants to prove that the
sale of the land to Parker was fair to Ozark and K.C. Properties as its mi-
nority member. If the defendants failed to meet that burden of fairness, K.C.
Properties should have been allowed to prove whatever damages it may
have suffered as a result of the defendants' breach of fiduciary duty.'9
Individuals should not be allowed to escape the strictures of fiduciary
obligation through complicated superstructures of limited liability entities,
when to do so defeats the justifiable expectations of their business partners
(the term "partner" here being used in its common, rather than its legal,
meaning). This is not an argument that the court should have pierced the
veil. It is an argument that entity status should be ignored for purposes of
determining liability for breaches of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and good
faith in a closely held business venture-at least where these matters are not
specifically addressed in the parties' contract. The point is that when indi-
viduals enter into a business venture together (whether directly as individu-
als or through a limited liability entity like an LLC), each places trust in the
17. Id. at 26-27, _ S.W.3d at.
18. Although the court does not state that the defendants concealed from K.C. Properties
their negotiations to sell the 34-acre tract to Parker, K.C. Properties alleged in its brief that
when the parties entered into the Ozark operating agreement on August 5th, the defendants
were already negotiating for the sale of the property to someone else. Appellants' Substituted
Brief, Volume I, at Arg 14, K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment
Partners, LLC, No. 07 00471 (Ark. Nov. 8, 2007). The defendants did not deny this allega-
tion in their brief. See Appellee's Brief at 14, K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkansas, Inc. v. Lo-
well Investment Partners, LLC, No. 07 00471 (Ark. Aug. 1, 2007).
19. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit by the President of K.C. Properties stating that
there was no other suitable land for the water park for sale in the relevant area. KC. Props. of
N.W Ark., Inc., 373 Ark. at 29, _ S.W.3d at _. The court upheld the trial court's finding
that the self-serving affidavit was insufficient to defeat the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on a promissory estoppel theory. Id. at 31, __ S.W.3d at . This ruling does not
preclude the possibility that if they had known that Ozark could not buy the defendants' 16.5
acres, the plaintiff could have invested its capital in a different project altogether. See Mein-
hard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
2009]
UALR LAW REVIEW
other and puts his interests at the mercy of the other. This relationship of
dependency is the bedrock upon which the law of fiduciary duty is built.
It is true that the law permits people to protect their assets by doing
business through limited liability entities. But while that device may be suf-
ficient to protect against the claims of outsiders, it should not, in the absence
of express agreement, defeat the expectation of loyalty and good faith that,
by virtue of his dependency, a business partner is entitled to. Put more simp-
ly, a person should be able safely to assume the honesty of his business
partner unless he has been told that he should not. Absent fair warning, he
should not have to be constantly on guard that the person who invited his
trust is going to cheat him.
I. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF LLCs
A. The Arkansas LLC Act's Provisions on Fiduciary Duties and the
Court's Reasoning
The starting point is, of course, the Arkansas LLC Act and what it says
about duties owed by managers and members of LLCs:
§.4-32-402. Liability to company; duties
Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement:
(1) A member or manager shall not be liable, responsible, or accountable
in damages or otherwise to the limited liability company or to the mem-
bers of the limited liability company for any action taken or failure to act
on behalf of the limited liability company unless the act or omission con-
stitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct; [and]
(2) Every member and manager must account to the limited liability
company and hold as trustee for it any profit or benefit derived by that
person without the consent of more than one-half (/2) by number of the
disinterested managers or members, or other persons participating in the
management of the business or affairs of the limited liability company,
from any transaction connected with the conduct or winding up of the
limited liability company or any use by the member or manager of its
property, including, but not limited to, confidential or proprietary infor-
mation of the limited liability company or other matters entrusted to the
person as a result of his or her status as manager or member .... 0
The court relied on subsection (1) of the statute to hold that K.C. Prop-
erties could not sue anyone except Ozark's other member, LIP, and Ozark's
20. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-32-402 (1)-(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
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manager, PMS. 2' The court then observed that neither LIP nor PMS sold the
34 acres to another party, and therefore "neither PMS nor LIP committed
any act or failure to act constituting gross negligence or willful misconduct
for which they could be held liable under § 4-32-402(1)."'22 Similarly, the
court held that K.C. Properties could not sue the individual defendants or
their personal LLCs for breach of contract because none of them were party
to the operating agreement.' Respecting the complexity of individual i-
mited liability entities created and the care with which the individual defen-
dants cloaked themselves against personal liability, the court set out in detail
how it was done:
It is clear that the individuals and their LLCs were not parties to the op-
eration [sic] agreement. "Pinnacle Management Services, LLC, Manag-
er, by Bill W. Schwyhart, Manager" and "Pinnacle Management Servic-
es, LLC, Manager, by Tim Graham, Manager" signed the agreement for
Ozark. "Pinnacle Management Services, LLC, Manager, by Bill W.
Schwyhart, Manager" and "Pinnacle Management Services, LLC, Man-
ager, by Tim Graham, Manager" signed for member LIP. Ken Bailey,
President of KC, signed for member KC. "Bill W. Schwyhart, Manager"
and 'Tim Graham, Manager" signed for Manager PMS. Therefore, the
LLCs were not parties to the operating agreement, and Schwyhart and
Graham only signed as agents of PMS. 4
The court then, in a confusing passage, swept aside an agency argu-
ment25 and stated that the plaintiff had cited no authority for its assertion
"that the actions of one corporation can be imputed to another solely by their
common membership and management. '26 Thus, the court concluded that
"there was no breach of the operating agreement or a breach of fiduciary
duties.' '27
What is remarkable is that the court pinned its rejection of the breach
of fiduciary duty claim solely on subsection (1) of Arkansas Code Anno-
tated section 4-32-402. Subsection (1) of the statute addresses only the fidu-
21. "Because LIP and KC were the only members of Ozark with PMS acting as manag-
er, LIP and PMS were the only entities that KC could bring suit against under section § [sic]
4-32-402(1)." K.C. Props. of N.W Ark., Inc., 373 Ark. at 21, _ S.W.3d at _. As dis-
cussed below, however, section 4-32-402(1) of the Arkansas Code Annotated does not apply
to breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and therefore does not prohibit suits against
members or managers for breach of that duty.
22. Id. at 21-22, _ S.W.3d at .
23. Id. at 23, _ S.W.3d at _
24. Id., __ S.W.3d at _. Evidently, the court meant the individual defendants' per-
sonal LLCs were not parties to the operating agreement.
25. Id. at 22-23, _ S.W.3d at.
26. Id. at 23, __ S.W.3d at __
27. Id. at 24, __ S.W.3d at __
2009]
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ciary duty of care. The issue under the duty of care is whether a fiduciary is
liable for mismanagement. According to the drafters of the American Bar
Association's Prototype Act on which the Arkansas LLC Act was mod-
eled,28 subsection (1)
sets forth the gross negligence standard of care for those participating in
management. This is similar to the standard commonly applied to corpo-
rate directors, managing partners, or general partners of limited partner-
ships. In general, as long as managers avoid self-interested and grossly
negligent conduct, their actions are protected by the business judgment
rule. 
29
As is evident from the fact that they were on both the buy side and the
sell side of the planned transaction in this case, the individual defendants
were engaged in self-interested behavior.3" Therefore, it is the other princip-
al fiduciary duty-the duty of loyalty-that was at issue. The duty of loyal-
ty is addressed by subsection (2) of Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-32-
402, set out above. Again, quoting from the drafters of the Prototype Act,
"Subsection [(2)], which is based on UPA § 21, sets forth the duty of loyalty
of LLC managers and managing members-that is, the duty to act without
being subject to an obvious conflict of interest .... ..
B. Piercing the LLC Veil
The tension between the existence of fiduciary obligation and the legis-
lative sanction of entities created for the purpose of avoiding personal liabil-
ity is nothing new. On the one hand, fiduciary duties are created for the pur-
28. See LONNIE R. BEARD & CAROL R. GOFORTH, ARKANSAS LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES CH. 5 (1994). Specifically, the Prototype Act was drafted by the Working Group
on the Prototype Limited Liability Company Act, Subcommittee on Limited Liability Com-
panies, Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, Section of
Business Law, American Bar Association. 3 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE,
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES app. C at App. C-i (2007) [hereinafter "RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE"].
29. RiBSTEN & KEATINGE, supra note 28, at C-51 (emphasis added).
30. As owners of PHR, the landowner, the individual defendants had an interest in get-
ting the highest possible price for the land. That interest conflicted with PMS's fiduciary duty
to Ozark and K.C. Properties to buy the land at the presumably favorable agreed-upon price.
This conflict gave the individual defendants a motive to use their control of PMS to favor
themselves at the expense of Ozark and K.C. Properties.
31. RimsTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 28, at App. C-52 (emphasis added). K.C. Proper-
ties asked for damages based on subsection (2), a pro rata portion of the benefit of the land
deal that the defendants received over and above the $3 million Ozark purchase price. Appel-
lants' Substituted Brief, Vol. I, at SoC 2, K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell
Investment Partners, LLC, No. 07-00471 (Ark. Nov. 8, 2007). I express no opinion about the
merits of this damage claim.
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pose of constraining a person who has power over another's resources from
using that control to benefit himself at the expense of the other.3 2 In the con-
text of an LLC, fiduciary duties are imposed on those who manage and con-
trol the business of the LLC-the manager in a manager-managed LLC like
Ozark.33
On the other hand, the legislature authorizes the creation of limited lia-
bility entities--corporations, limited liability companies, limited partner-
ships, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability limited partner-
ships-specifically so that persons can invest capital in an enterprise secure
in the knowledge that only their invested capital is at risk if the enterprise
fails. Personal assets not contributed to the enterprise are beyond the reach
of the enterprise's creditors. The purpose of authorizing limited liability
enterprises is to encourage investment of capital in businesses. People are
much more likely to invest if they can control their liability exposure.
Sometimes these two doctrines-fiduciary duties and limited liabili-
ty--come into conflict, and a court decides that fiduciary duty trumps li-
32. The great Roman satirist Juvenal posed the question: "'quis custodiet ipsos cus-
todes'-roughly translated, 'who will guard the guardians'?" Salvato v. Illinois Dept. of
Human Rights, 155 F.3d 922, 923 (7th Cir. 1998). In our legal system, the answer is the law
of fiduciary duty. Whether found in case law or in statutes, the law of fiduciary duty con-
strains the ability of those in control of property of others from taking unfair advantage of
those whose property is at their mercy. See, e.g., Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 1178, 313
S.W.2d 802, 808 (1958) ("The law imposes a high standard of conduct upon an officer or
director of a corporation, predicated upon the fact that he has voluntarily accepted a position
of trust and has assumed control of property of others. Even a higher standard of duty rested
upon .... [t]he vice-president and director [because] he was the manager as well.") Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
33. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402 (LEXIS Repl. 2001). Similarly, fiduciary duties are
imposed on members in member-managed LLCs. Id. Members in manager-managed LLCs
have no duties to the LLC or the other members for acts taken solely in their capacity as
members. Id. § 4-32-402(3). Cf. Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2006-2647-COA-R3-CV, 2007
WL 2700068 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2007) (controlling members in member-managed
LLC violated their statutory duty of good faith by expelling other members and reselling their
ownership units to a third party at a high price).
The prefatory language in section 4-32-402 of the Arkansas Code indicates that
these standards may be varied by the operating agreement. The extent to which fiduciary
duties can be restricted or eliminated, however, remains unsettled. Fendler, supra note 5. In
addition to variance of the standards, the LLC Act permits the parties to agree that one who
breaches is relieved of liability for monetary damages. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-404(1)
(LEXIS Repl. 2001). Cf. Frances Fendler Rosenzweig, Director-Exculpation Clauses Under
the Arkansas Business Corporation Act of 1987, 15 UALR L.J. 337 (1993) (interpreting
analogous provision in the Arkansas Business Corporation Act of 1987). Moreover, the sta-
tute authorizes the LLC to indemnify members and managers against liability. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-32-404(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
In this case, the Ozark operating agreement did not modify the statutory standards in




mited liability. One legal theory familiar to lawyers is "piercing the veil," a
doctrine that extends to both LLCs and corporations.34 Piercing cases are
entirely fact-specific, and it is difficult to predict what facts will induce a
court to apply the doctrine in a particular case.35
The court in K.C Properties refused to apply the piercing doctrine,
dismissing the plaintiffs argument as one merely asserting that the veil
should be pierced because the principals of the defendant LLCs were the
same: "[B]ased on our case law, PMS, LIP, and the individual LLCs are
separate and distinct legal entities regardless of whether they include the
same people. 36 However, the court missed the point. Even if the court cor-
rectly refused to pierce the LLC veil in this case, it should have held that the
individuals controlling the manager of Ozark, while also controlling PHR,
the seller of the land, owed fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith direct-
ly to the plaintiff, so that piercing was unnecessary.
C. Analogy to Limited Partnership Law
Cases involving partnerships are relevant to the issue of whether busi-
ness partners owe fiduciary duties to their co-partners, despite an interposed
limited liability entity. For example, in Meinhard v. Salmon,37 the seminal
case on the scope of fiduciary duties owed by partners to one another,38 the
court ignored the fact that the defalcating managing partner took title in the
name of a corporation he had formed and controlled.39 What mattered was
the fact that he personally owed a fiduciary duty to his partner.4°
34. Anderson v. Stewart, 366 Ark. 203, 234 S.W.3d 295 (2006) (affirming trial court's
decision to pierce the veil of an LLC).
35. The case law is so muddled that it has been called "'jurisprudence by metaphor or
epithet."' ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 305 (10th ed. 2007) (quoting PHILIP L. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS: PROCEDURAL LAW 8 (1983)).
36. KC. Properties, 373 Ark. at 14, 33, _ S.W.3d -, (2008). In rejecting K.C.
Properties' piercing claim, the court relied on Mannon v. R.A. Young & Sons Coal Co., 207
Ark. 98, 179 S.W.2d 457 (1944). In fact, Mannon was inapposite. The court did not decide it
as a piercing case, but rather the court disposed of it because the action was brought in the
wrong court, was time-barred, and did not allege that the controlling corporation had wrong-
fully converted any of the controlled corporation's specific property or assets. Id. at 102, 179
S.W.2d at 459-60.
37. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
38. Meinhard's status as a leading case on the law of fiduciary duty is confirmed by the
fact that it "has been cited in more than one thousand reported opinions." Robert W. Hiliman,
Closely-Held Firms and the Common Law of Fiduciary Duty: What Explains the Enduring
Qualities of a Punctilio?, 41 TULSA L. REv. 441, 445 (2006). The Arkansas Supreme Court
specifically approved Meinhard in Johnson v. Lion Oil Co., 216 Ark. 736, 740, 227 S.W.2d
162, 165 (1950).




Cases involving corporate general partners of limited partnerships are
particularly instructive on this point. Limited partnerships, of course, are
partnerships that involve two kinds of partners: (1) limited partners, who
customarily contribute most of the capital to the business, generally do not
participate in the management of the partnership business, and enjoy limited
liability,4 and (2) general partners, who manage the business and are perso-
nally liable for partnership obligations to the same extent as general partners
in general partnerships.42 Sometime around 1970, when tax shelters were
legal and popular, limited partnerships with marginally capitalized corpora-
tions serving as the general partner began to flourish.43 The theoretical unli-
mited liability of the general partner was, in practice, limited to the amount
of the general partner's capital, which could be marginal.
Professor Robert W. Hamilton, a leading authority on the law of busi-
ness associations," notes that from the point of view of limited partners,
there are a number of significant and deleterious differences between a cor-
porate general partner and a human general partner. Two of these differenc-
es are significant to this discussion about LLCs managed by other LLCs:
A claim of breach of fiduciary duty against a general partner is not worth
very much if the general partner itself is a corporation with nominal as-
sets. If there is to be recovery, it must be based on a theory that holds
the parties that manage the general partner liable for the general partner's
breach of duty ....
41. Traditionally, limited partners were prohibited from taking part in control of the
partnership business; the penalty for doing so was the loss of limited liability. 3 ALAN R.
BROMBERG & LARRY E. RiBSTEN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEiN ON PARTNERSHIP § 11.02(b) (2008)
[hereinafter BROMBERG & RiBsTEIN]. The 1976 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
allowed limited partners to have some limited participation in management without losing
limited liability. Id. § 11.02(c). The Uniform Act was amended in 1985 to loosen the stric-
tures even more, enlarging the list of activities in which a limited partner could safely engage
and more importantly, requiring that the plaintiff creditor have a reasonable belief that the
defendant was a general partner. Id. §11.02(d). The most recent iteration of the Uniform Act,
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001), simply abolishes the control rule and provides
that a limited partner is not liable for an obligation of the partnership "even if the limited
partner participates in the management and control of the limited partnership." UNiF. LTD.
P'sHiP ACT § 303 (2001). Arkansas adopted this most recent version of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act by 2007 Ark. Acts 15.
42. 3 BROMBERG & RiBsTEN, supra note 41, at § 11.01(b).
43. Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate General Partners of Limited Partnerships, I J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 73, 79-80 (1997) [hereinafter "Hamilton"].
44. Minerva House Drysdale Regents Chair, Emeritus, University of Texas Law School.




[Moreover], there are potential conflicts of fiduciary duty whenever a
corporation (as contrasted with an individual) is the general partner of a
limited partnership. The general partner obviously owes fiduciary duties
to the limited partnership and to the limited partners. Corporate officers
and directors also owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders of a corporate
partner. These fiduciary duties may conflict.
Functionally, there is little difference between a limited partnership
with a corporate general partner on the one hand and an LLC (which, for the
sake of clarity, I will call the "primary LLC") with a manager or managing
member that is itself also an LLC on the other.4 In both cases, any claim the
members of the primary LLC have against the manager is worth little if the
manager has only nominal assets. In both cases, the manager has a potential
conflict of interest that may give rise to such a claim. In the LLC context, if
a situation arises in which the managing LLC will gain if the primary LLC
loses, the managing LLC's selfish interest (or, if it is a manager-managed
LLC, that manager's fiduciary duties to its own members) conflicts with its
45. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 87. The other differences that Professor Hamilton notes
are:
First, a corporate general partner is subject to the control of somebody else.
With an individual as a general partner, there is no doubt as to whose decisions
will be evaluated under applicable principles of fiduciary duty. Where a corpo-
rate general partner is involved, the decision maker may be a panel of individuals
or a single person whose identity may or may not be known to the limited part-
ners and whose financial interest in the limited partnership may be great or may
be small.
Second, it is relatively easy to control transfers of managerial authority to
third persons when individual general partners are involved .... In contrast, a
corporate general partner is inherently an economic entity which itself may be
purchased or sold.... [w]ithout a change in the identity of the general partner it-
self. ... From the standpoint of the inactive investors who are the limited part-
ners, the identity of those in control of the general partner is usually more impor-
tant that the formal identity of the general partner itself.
Fourth, even if a corporate general partner is reasonably capitalized at the out-
set, subsequent transactions may bleed off these assets to the owners of the cor-
poration without the consent of the limited partnership and without involving a
fraudulent conveyance but greatly increasing the potential risks to the limited
partners.
Id. at 86-87. These observations hold true equally when LLCs are managers of other LLCs.
46. This discussion applies equally when any limited liability entity is the manager of an
LLC, e.g., a corporation or a limited liability partnership. See, e.g., Victor Peterson & Alison
N. Zirn, Corporate Directors LLCs and Liability: It's not Settled, but Caution is Advised, 12
Bus. L. TODAY, Jul.-Aug. 2003 at 57 (applying the limited partnership cases to the problem
of corporate managers of LLCs). I focus here on LLC managers (1) because K.C. Properties
involved LLC managers and (2) because of the popularity in small businesses or limited
business ventures of using the LLC form of enterprise in preference to other forms of limited
liability entities. See, e.g., Fendler, supra note 5, at 643.
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fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith owed to the primary LLC.47 Like
corporate directors, the manager of an LLC "cannot lawfully manage the
affairs of one of the [LLCs] in the interest of the other.
4 8
Because persons who have conflicts of interest are naturally inclined to
benefit themselves, Professor Hamilton concludes that in the limited part-
nership context, the law of fiduciary duty should extend directly from those
who control an entity general partner to the limited partnership and the li-
mited partners.49 Case law supports this position, limited partnership cases in
which courts have imposed personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty on
shareholders, officers, or directors of corporate general partners of a limited
partnership. The best known case is a Delaware decision, In re USACafes,
L.P. Litigation." That case involved a limited partnership called USACafes,
L.P. with a corporate general partner. A third party, Metsa Acquisition Cor-
poration, wanted to buy the limited partnership's assets. Metsa paid $72.6
million to the holders of the limited partnership interests. Metsa paid an ad-
ditional $15-s17 million to the corporate general partner and the owners and
directors of the corporate general partner. The limited partners sued the di-
rectors personally on the theory that the defendants had breached their fidu-
ciary duty by, in effect, taking bribes to refrain from bargaining for a higher
price for the limited partnership's assets.
The defendants argued that while it was clear that the corporate general
partner owed fiduciary duties to the limited partners, they, as directors of the
corporate general partner, did not. The Delaware court disagreed and held
that the directors of the corporate general partner owed some degree of fidu-
ciary duty directly to the limited partners. While the court did not define the
limits of the directors' obligation, it concluded that "it surely entails the duty
not to use control over the partnership's property to advantage the corporate
director at the expense of the partnership."'"
Professor Hamilton, relying on In re USACafes and other cases,52 con-
cludes as follows:
In appropriate cases, fiduciary duties traditionally associated with
the general partner should be applied to shareholders, directors, and of-
ficers of the corporate general partner. Both the limited partnership and
its limited partners should be able to enforce these duties directly. Unless
these duties are extended to shareholders or managers of the corporate
general partner there is a significant likelihood of opportunistic or
47. "No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he
will be devoted to the one and despise the other." Matthew 6:24 (Revised Standard Version).
48. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co. v. Bums, 216 Ark. 288, 290, 225 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1949).
49. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 107.
50. 600 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991).
51. Id. at49.
52. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 88-92 & 89 n.61 (citing cases).
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wrongful conduct by the shareholders or managers, which may injure li-
mited partners and defeat their reasonable expectations when they in-
vested in the limited partnership. Many courts have reached the proper
conclusions in these cases but have not articulated a consistent and gen-
eral rationale. They should do so in the future relying on the ample au-
thority that now exists that permits every court to apply fiduciary duties
directly to the shareholders and managers of the corporate general part-
ner.
53
The same rationale supports a rule that, in the absence of an enforceable
agreement to the contrary, fiduciary duties owed by the manager of an LLC
53. Id. at 107. In KC. Properties, of course, the land did not belong to Ozark. Id. K.C.
Properties, however, had an admitted expectation that the sale would go through-an expec-
tation that the defendants took away. A trier of fact should have been permitted to determine
whether K.C. Properties' expectation was justifiable and thus whether the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties.
A number of other cases support the result reached in In re USACafes. See, e.g.,
Spitzer v. Shanley Corp., 870 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (individual who was chairman of
board of corporate general partner and officer and director of general partner's parent corpo-
ration held personally liable to limited partners for breach of the duty of care); In re Inte-
grated Resources, Inc., No. 90-B-10411(CB), 1990 WL 325414 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22,
1990) (imposing fiduciary obligations on sole shareholder of corporate general partner in
limited partnership); Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160,
173 (Del. 2002) ("[W]here a corporate general partner fails to comply with a contractual
standard [of fiduciary duty] that supplants traditional fiduciary duties and the general part-
ner's failure is caused by its directors and controlling stockholder, the directors and control-
ling stockholder remain liable.") (quoting lower court opinion, 795 A.2d 1, 34 (Del. Ch.
2001)) (the Delaware legislature overruled Gotham Partners on another point, see Fendler,
supra note 5, at 673-75); 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN supra note 41, at § 6.07(a) n.38.
One Arkansas case indicates that a person who is a part owner and manager of a
corporate general partner of a limited partnership does not in that capacity owe fiduciary
duties to the limited partners. Smith v. Elder, 312 Ark. 384, 392, 849 S.W.2d 513, 517
(1993). This case, however, should hold little precedential value. The individual in question,
Smith, was the limited partners' attorney as well as an owner and officer of the corporate
general partner, Shiloh. The court's observation that Smith's failure to disclose certain facts
to the limited partner/clients "arose from his relationship to the limited partners as their per-
sonal attorney and not from any written obligation imposed by the partnership agreements,"
was unnecessary to the decision. The issue dealt with the appropriate statute of limitations,
and the three-year statute that the court chose applied regardless of the source of Smith's
fiduciary duty. Moreover, the court did not explain the basis for the statement and failed to
recognize that fiduciary duties, although they may involve written obligations, ultimately
arise because of the power the manager has over the property of the investors. Justice Brown,
concurring, saw the real point: "By not disclosing all pertinent information regarding his self-
dealing as a principal of the general partner and by mismanaging the partnership, all of
which benefitted Shiloh and Smith personally, he breached his fiduciary duty to the limited
partners and violated the partnership agreement." Id. at 396, 849 S.W.2d at 519 (Brown, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). In any event, Smith has never been cited for the proposition
that owners and managers of a corporate general partner are insulated from liability for
breach of fiduciary duty owed to the limited partners.
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to its members should extend to and through the chain of owners of the
manager LLC.
III. THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH
The duty of loyalty is preeminent in the constellation of the fiduciary
duties recognized by common law.' As it originated in the law of trusts, the
duty of loyalty was a pure duty of unselfishness; a fiduciary was prohibited
from gaining any personal benefit from his position, even if the gain did not
harm the beneficiary.55 In modem business organizations, the duty does not
extend so far. For example, under current Arkansas partnership law, a part-
ner does not breach his fiduciary duty simply because his action benefits
himself.56
Despite the fact that the duty of loyalty is not as stringent as it may
have been originally in the trust context 57 and that it may be restricted by the
parties' agreement to some extent under modem LLC statutes,58 the duty in
modem business entities is still a potent one. So it was in K.C. Properties,
because the operating agreement did not restrict the respective LLCs' or the
individual defendants' duty of loyalty in any relevant way.59 Accordingly,
the duty is the one set out in section 4-32-402(2) of the Arkansas Code,
which is based on the traditional formulation of the duty under section 21 of
the original Uniform Partnership Act.6° According to the drafters of the Pro-
totype Act, "[blecause of the similarity of this section [the section codified
as ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402(2)] with the UPA [§ 21], it is anticipated
54. Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U.L. REv. 665, 667 (2009) [herei-
nafter "Leib"].
55. RESTATEMENT THiRD OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (2007); Webber, supra note
6, at 42.
56. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-46-404(e) (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
57. E.g., Webber, supra note 6, at 42-46.
58. See Fendler, supra note 5, at 669-70. Although the Arkansas LLC Act permits the
parties to agree to a restriction of fiduciary duties, at least if the restriction is specific and
reasonable, it should not be interpreted to permit the complete elimination of the duty of
loyalty. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-404 (LEXIS Repl. 2001). Indeed, Delaware is the only
jurisdiction that permits parties by agreement to completely eliminate the duty of loyalty, and
even Delaware prohibits consensual elimination of the duty of good faith. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18 § I101(c) (LEXIS Supp. 2006).
59. See supra note 5.
60. Section 21(1) of the original Uniform Partnership Act provided:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit and hold as trustee
for it and profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from
any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the part-
nership or from any use by him of its property.
UNIF. PARTNERSHiP AcT 1914 § 21(1). Arkansas's version of the original UPA was identical.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-42-404(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2001) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 2005).
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that the courts will interpret a section such as this to impose duties similar
to those in the general partnership .... ,61 This means that the fiduciary-
the manager in the LLC and, as asserted in this article, those who own and
control it-may "pursue self-dealing only after getting an informed waiver
from her beneficiary and [must] avoid conflicts of interest, secret profits,
and misappropriating benefits that should accrue to the beneficiary or the
joint relationship.
In addition to the duty of loyalty, the fiduciary owes the duty of good
faith.63 It is clear in Arkansas that, as a matter of common law, the duty of
good faith is a fiduciary one.6' The law holds the fiduciary to a higher stan-
dard than the duty of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in every con-
tract. 6' The contractual duty of good faith "emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party."' Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes
clear that the contractual duty of good faith cannot be defeated through the
device of a separate limited liability entity:
A, an oil dealer, borrows $100,000 from B, a supplier, and agrees to buy
all his requirements of certain oil products from B on stated terms until
the debt is repaid. Before the debt is repaid, A makes a new arrangement
with C, a competitor of B. Under the new arrangement A's business is
conducted by a corporation formed and owned by A and C and managed
by A, and the corporation buys all its oil products from C. The new ar-
61. 3 RIBsTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 28, at App. C-52 (emphasis added).
62. Leib, supra note 54, at 10.
63. The Arkansas Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sims, 220 Ark. 643, 249 S.W.2d 832
(1952), noted that the rigorous duty of good faith between partners that it applied in that case
is recognized by "the Uniform Partnership Act, Act 263 of 1941 .... Id. at 650, 249 S.W.2d
at 836 (citing Zack v. Schulman, 213 Ark. 122, 210 S.W.2d 124 (1948)).
64. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coughlin, 369 Ark. 365, 370, 255 S.W.3d 424, 428
(2007); Cole v. Laws, 349 Ark. 177, 185, 76 S.W.3d 878, 883 (2002). Under Arkansas's
Partnership Acts, the duty of good faith is classified as an "obligation" rather than a fiduciary
duty. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-46-404(d) (LEXIS Repl. 2001) (partnerships); ARK. CODE ANN. §
4-47-408(d) (LEXIS Supp. 2007) (limited partnerships). The significance of the distinction is
far from clear. In addition, it is unclear how the fiduciary duty of good faith, normally un-
derstood as adjunct to the fiduciary duty of loyalty, relates to the duty to refrain from "willful
misconduct" in the articulation of the LLC fiduciary duty of care in ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-
402(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2001). Both "good faith" and "willful misconduct" focus on the actor's
culpable state of mind. This is one of the many instances of inartful drafting in the Arkansas
LLC Act.
The Delaware Supreme Court also views the duty of good faith as an obligation
distinct from the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 63-67 (Del. 2006).
65. Country Comer Food & Drug, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust Co. of Conway, 332
Ark. 645, 655, 966 S.W.2d 894, 899 (1998) (recognizing "that every contract imposes an
obligation to act in good faith").
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
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rangement may be found to be a subterfuge or evasion and a breach of
contract by A.
67
The fiduciary duty of good faith, on the other hand, is not necessarily
tied to contract. More importantly, the Arkansas Supreme Court's descrip-
tions of the duty indicate that the fiduciary duty of good faith is more rigor-
ous than the contractual duty, "stricter than the morals of the marketplace. 68
Emphasizing the point, the court has described the duty as "the utmost good
faith,"'69 requiring "perfect fairness, 70 "utmost frankness and honesty,"7 ' and
"utmost... integrity. '"72
One component of the fiduciary duty of good faith is a duty of disclo-
sure. The fiduciary must disclose to the beneficiary material facts that fall
within the embrace of the relationship.73 For example, in the recent case of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coughlin74 the court held that as part of his duty of
good faith, an employee has "a duty as a fiduciary to disclose material facts.
... In Coughlin, the employee's failure to disclose to his employer that he
had been stealing from the employer could void the self-dealing retirement
agreement and release so that the employer could sue the employee for fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty. The court quoted with approval language from
a Louisiana case, Soderquist v. Kramer:76 "The duty imposed on a fiduciary
embraces the obligation to render a full and fair disclosure to the beneficiary
of all facts which materially affect his rights and interest.' 77 This has in fact
been the law in Arkansas for over half a century. In Alexander v. Sims, 78 the
court held that where, in connection with the execution of an agreement that
upon the death of one of the partners, the other would succeed to her inter-
est, the procuring partner breached her fiduciary duty of good faith by con-
67. Id., cmt. d, illus. 1.
68. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). See Texas Oil
& Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 282 Ark. 268, 270, 668 S.W.2d 16, 17 (1984)
(quoting Meinhard).
69. Boswell v. Gillett, 226 Ark. 935, 944, 295 S.W.2d 758, 763 (1956).
70. Alexander v. Sims, 220 Ark. 643,650, 249 S.W.2d 832, 836 (1952).
71. Id. See also Drummond v. Batson, 162 Ark. 407, 420, 258 S.W. 616, 620 (1924)
("utmost fairness and honesty").
72. Alexander, 220 Ark. at 650, 249 S.W.2d at 836.
73. The duty to disclose was the core principle applied in Meinhard, and it has been
applied in innumerable other cases. See 2 BROMBERG & RBSmEIN, supra note 41, at § 6.06.
74. 369 Ark. 365, 255 S.W.3d 424 (2007).
75. Id. at 373, 255 S.W.3d at 430. See also Willman v. Riceland Foods, Inc., No.
4:07CV00488-WAW, 2007 WL 2990422 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 9, 2007) (joinder was not fraudu-
lent, so remand to state court was appropriate, where plaintiff members of Riceland Foods,
Inc., a farmer-owned cooperative, alleged that Riceland failed timely to disclose that its rice
was contaminated).
76. 595 So.2d 825 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
77. Id. at 830.
78. 220 Ark. 643, 249 S.W.2d 832 (1952).
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cealing from her co-partner her knowledge of the latter's impending death.79
Among the many authorities the court found persuasive was a passage from
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnership:
The necessity of entire good faith, and of the absence of fraud on the part
of partners towards each other, is inculcated by Cicero in terms of deep
import and sound morality... . Good faith not only requires, that every
partner should not make any false representations to his partners, but al-
so that he should abstain from all concealments, which may be injurious
to the partnership business.
80
The same rule applies in modem partnership law. The current Arkansas
Uniform Partnership Act requires that partners disclose without demand
"information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably
required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the
partnership agreement or this [Act]."
' 8
IV. POTENTIAL BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN K. C. PROPERTIES
Putting these principles together-the principle that individuals who
own and control a manager LLC owe fiduciary duties to the primary LLC
and its members and the principle that those fiduciary duties consist of the
duties of loyalty and good faith, including the duty of disclosure-it is ap-
parent that there is a question of fact for the fact-finder here: Did these de-
fendants breach the fiduciary duty they owed the plaintiff?. A recent New
York decision with facts somewhat analogous to K.C. Properties is instruc-
tive.
In Blue Chip Emerald LLC v. Allied Partners, Inc. ,82 the court was con-
fronted by a joint venture structured as an LLC called Ceppeto Enterprises
LLC (the "Venture"). The Venture was owned 50% by BCE, an acronym
the court used to refer to Blue Chip Emerald LLC and its owners, and 50%
by a group the court called the Richard and Eric Hadar Defendants, com-
posed of Ceppeto Holdings LLC and its individual principals named Hadar.
Ceppeto Holdings LLC was the managing member of the Venture. The Ven-
ture's only asset was a building in Manhattan. The BCE plaintiffs sold their
79. Id. at 649-51, 249 S.W.2d at 836-37. Accord, Smith v. Citation Mfg. Co. Inc., 266
Ark. 591, 587 S.W.2d 39 (1979) (corporate officer and director had duty to disclose the fact
that other corporation he owned would not be able to pay for equipment sold to it).
80. Alexander v. Sims, 220 Ark. 643,650, 249 S.W.2d 832, 836 (1952) (quoting JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 172 (4th ed. 1855)).
81. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-46-403(c)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
82. 299 A.D.2d 278, 750 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2002) (cited with approval by the Arkansas




interest in the building to the Hadar defendants for a price based on an $80
million valuation of the building. Two weeks later, the Hadar defendants
sold the building for $200 million to a third party. When the BCE plaintiffs
sued the Hadar defendants for breach of fiduciary duty, the trial court dis-
missed the case on the ground of a release that the BCE plaintiffs had signed
when they sold their interest to the Hadar defendants.
The Appellate Division reversed, saying,
The key fact overlooked by the [lower] court is that the Hadar Defen-
dants, as co-venturers and, in particular, as managing co-venturers (see
Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 73 N.Y.2d 461, 465, citing Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 468), were fiduciaries of BCE in matters relating to the
Venture until the moment the buy-out transaction closed, and therefore
owe[d] [BCE] a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty .... [I]t is well
established that, when a fiduciary, in furtherance of its individual inter-
ests, deals with the beneficiary of the duty in a matter relating to the fi-
duciary relationship, the fiduciary is strictly obligated to make "full dis-
closure" of all material facts ....
It follows from the foregoing principles that, in negotiating the Buy-Out
Agreement [by which the Hadar defendants bought BCE's interest], the
Hadar Defendants had no right to keep to themselves or misrepresent
material facts concerning their efforts to sell or lease the Venture's Prop-
erty, such as, for example, the prices prospective purchasers were offer-
ing to pay.
83
Notice that the New York court did not allow the defendants to escape
liability because they were dealing through their personal LLCs. It was clear
to the court that the real fiduciaries were the individual defendants. For that
reason, the court reinstated the complaint against the defendants.
Similarly, if the facts were as K.C. Properties alleged, the individual
defendants here owed a duty of disclosure to K.C. Properties because they
were the principals behind and controlled PMS, the manager of Ozark. The
individual defendants, as fiduciaries of Ozark, "had no right to keep to
themselves ... material facts" 8 concerning the property they had agreed to
sell to Ozark. If the plaintiff justifiably expected that the defendants would
see their transaction through to closing or termination, the defendants' beha-
vior would be a breach of their fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith.
Assuming that the plaintiff could show compensable damages, the case
should have gone to trial.
83. Id. at 279-80, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 294.




K.C. Properties presents a classic case of parties using limited liability
entities to protect their personal assets from the reach of those whom they
have injured. Although the law authorizes limited liability as a component
of some types of business organizations, that limited liability is itself limited
by separate rules of fiduciary obligation. The fiduciary duties of loyalty and
good faith are the law's guarantee of honest and fair behavior by those who
are in control of other people's property, thereby protecting the vulnerable.
As I have argued elsewhere, public policy mandates that the law recognize a
core of minimum decencies incumbent on the manager of an LLC.85 By ex-
tension, the same policy should apply to those who own and control that
manager. To allow an individual to reap the benefits of the control he has
over others' property while shedding its burdens solely through the fiction
of employing limited liability entities gives effect to one legal principle-
limited liability-while ignoring the other-fiduciary obligation. In this
case, the court should have recognized that the individual defendants owed
fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith to the plaintiff and that K.C. Prop-
erties was entitled to its day in court.
85. Fendler, supra note 5, at 675-86.
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